In the wake of the recent global refugee and migration crisis, Hannah Arendt's defense of the right to have political rights has become prominent again. Her work is read as an early reminder that the internationally promoted human rights regime may be merely a rhetorical reference, without the will or international authority for political action. I examine Arendt's analysis in its historical context and then turn to consider Ricoeur's understanding of human rights. The capability to respond to and to be held accountable by others marks Ricoeur's ethics of responsibility. He agrees with Arendt that legal authority must rest upon power (Macht) and not domination (Herrschaft), but he insists that the undercurrent of common power is the moral capability of an agent. The essay examines the ramifications of Ricoeur's ethics for the current crisis of refugees and migration, and it argues that he offers, at the same time, a correction useful for the ethical foundation of human rights.
during the establishment of the United Nations Human Rights Framework after World War II. In my paper, I want to address two approaches to human rights in relation to the problem of refugees, Hannah Arendt's and Paul Ricoeur's, and I want to ask whether they can help us to decipher the human rights question as it relates to those people who flee from the political space in which they may or may not have de jure citizens' rights but certainly have lost them de facto.
2-Arendt on Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights
As is well known, like perhaps nobody else with this sharpness of diagnosis, Hannah Arendt pointed to the concrete historical context of statelessness in two major texts, one an essay published in English as The Rights of Man and in German as Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht, and the other the famous ninth chapter of the Origins of Totalitarianism.
3 In these two works,
Arendt explains her reservation, if not opposition, to the Human Rights Regime that became the guiding framework of international relations after World War II-and she does so because of loss of rights of refugees and minorities that the world witnessed in the first half of the century. 4 Her analysis has become prominent again during the more recent refugee crisis in Europe, but it becomes even more important in view of the 2017 Rohingya crisis in Asia. It is therefore instructive to look into Arendt's reasoning that made her so skeptical of the UN Human Rights
Declaration. On Arendt's account, the root problem of the 20 th century's forced migration is the statelessness of the refugees. Providing a historical analysis, Arendt points to the fact that stateless refugees emerged at the end of the 19 th century in the context of a new geopolitical order that emerged in Eastern Europe and Russia after World War I. It is this war, Arendt holds, which "shattered the facade of Europe's political system to lay bare the hidden frame." 5 The 'hidden frame,' Arendt implies, is a rule that resembles the early modern transnational colonialism.
However, this transformed colonialism lies within European nation-states, leaving millions of people without any civil or political rights; but at the same time, it does not affect the facade of what by now has had been coined their inalienable human rights. Arendt is outraged to the point of bitterness that even after World War II and the Shoah, the international community has fallen into exactly the same trap as it did after World War I, declaring 'human'rights inalienable, without reconsidering the effects on those who are not protected in their own countries. Arendt's opposition is both theoretical and practical, I would hold: it is theoretical with respect to how we understand human rights and practical insofar as she did not expect the problem of statelessness to disappear. As we know today, she could not have been more correct about the second point, while her theoretical case against the Unite Nations Declaration of Human Rights is still open to debate.
During the 1920s, Arendt holds, Eastern European states and Russia, in particular, gained the national right to declare hundreds of thousands of people stateless. These stateless people stripped of their citizens' rights and legal protection, together with the minorities within states, became most vulnerable to discrimination and persecution. Minorities became vulnerable, too, because they fell under so-called laws of exception in their states, but stateless people were 'denationalized,' 'expatriated,' or 'deported.' Wherever they went, it seems they were declared not only by the states but also by civil society: 'not wanted.' Slowly, they became the "rightless"
people that foreshadowed the victims of the politics of Nazi totalitarianism only a few years later, in the 1930s and 1940s.
The first loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of their homes, and this meant the loss of the entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world. This calamity is far from unprecedented; in the long memory of history, forced migrations of individuals or whole groups of people for political or economic reasons look like everyday occurrences. What is unprecedented is not the loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one. Suddenly, there was no place on earth where migrants could go without the severest restrictions, no country where they would be disseminated, no territory where they could found a new community of their own. This, moreover, had next to nothing to do with any material problem of overpopulation; it was a problem not of space but of political organization.
The second loss, which the rightless suffered, was the loss of government protection and this did not imply just the loss of legal status in their own, but in all countries. (Arendt 1968, 293) After World War I, the League of Nations, predecessor of the United Nations in many ways, became the institution responsible for stateless people, but it was rendered toothless because of the political structure of international law that was still centered on the sovereignty of nation states.
Space, we can see, matters: the practices of denationalization, expulsion, deportation, and detention in concentration camps existed long before Hitler's so-called "Endlösung" or "Final solution" began in 1941, i.e. the Shoah as total destruction of the Jewish people. Long before the totalitarian regime was installed, a vicious circle had set off the dynamic of expulsion: politics echoed the social rejection of certain groups, which in turn was fueled by the laws against these groups. Together, civil society and their political representatives made every effort to avoid having to live alongside certain minorities, political dissidents, or, again and again, "the" Jews.
Arendt reads the reference to inalienable human rights, which the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 takes up from the early modern natural law tradition, as 'merely' natural rights, namely as unconnected to any right to political membership. Indeed, the concept of human rights could be interpreted in different ways: for example, some interpreters read it from the perspective of the theological natural law tradition of medieval Christian theology, which always viewed them as distinct from social or political rights. Others read it from the perspective of secular political philosophy, in light of the early modern reinterpretation of natural law theory. In the beginning, the "rights of Man" promised a protection of the individual against the state:
"Therefore throughout the 19th century, the consensus of opinion was that human rights had to be invoked whenever individuals needed protection against the new sovereignty of the state and the new arbitrariness of society." 10 Yet, the shift from Divine law to Human law results in a paradox with the political emphasis of the concept of the 'people': because the state is regarded as the expression of the sovereignty of the people (not the prince or king), those who do not belong to "us," lose any protection.
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Echoing Edmund Burke's critique of human rights, an "ironical, bitter, and belated confirmation" of his polemic against natural rights, 12 Arendt acknowledges that, separated from the political sphere, human rights are merely abstract rights that cannot be enforced. While she may disagree with Burke on national rights, Arendt agrees that rights must be conceived as political rights rather than natural rights. Looking at the phenomenon of the loss of citizenship, Arendt holds, for the stateless people the invocation of some abstract "inalienable" rights offers no protection:
"The stateless people were as convinced as the minorities that loss of national rights was identical with loss of human rights, that the former inevitable entailed the latter." 13 Faced with the new problem of statelessness, it is clear that Burke's national rights do not offereither de jure or de facto-the protection that would have helped refugees: their natural rights do not translate into the right to a space to dwell, a space, a community, and a polity to which they belong. Under the condition of the "one world," i.e. a world that is divided into different nation states, with no uncovered territory, the loss of citizenship is de facto the loss of any right:
"Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether." 14 Arendt's point is this: when people have nowhere to stay and nowhere to go as members of a polity, they become merely persons in the 'abstract'; stripped of their right to political participation. When they are rendered merely 'natural persons,' they become "nothing but a man," in the "abstract nakedness of being nothing but human," "mere existence," thrown back into "a peculiar state of nature" 15 -all formulations that show the bitterness Arendt felt that it was exactly this 'state' that was declared as a right of the human being: The loss of human rights was not the loss of this 'natural state' but the loss of belonging.
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The great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on the natural givenness, on their mere differentiation. They lack that tremendous equalizing of differences, which comes from being citizens of some Commonwealth, and yet, since they are no longer allowed to partake in the human artifice, they begin to belong to the human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific animal species. The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general-without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without the deed by which to identify and specify himself-and different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within an action upon a common world, loses all significance.
17
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arendt holds, does not respond to this discrepancy between "mere" human rights and political rights; human rights are merely a rhetorical reference to the 'natural rights'; they are not a political-legal concept precisely because they are rights that cannot be enforced in a political space. Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity, which has befallen ever-increasing numbers of people.
Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of polity itself expels him from humanity.
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Hence, we are faced with two different narratives on human rights. The first narrative is that of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; their proponents, grounding human rights in the natural law tradition or its secular version that 'sacralizes' the human person, are the implied addressees of Arendt's polemic because they do not respond to the political nature of rights;
hence they have no answer to the break-down of national responsibilities to protect their citizens:
in declaring groups as non-eligible, nation-states have established the very problem to which the human rights regime aims to respond, but without having the necessary enforcement measures against the states. Moreover, the UN Declaration presupposes that human beings do in fact belong to a community, thereby ignoring the long-existing problem of stateless people or minorities without rights. The second narrative is Arendt's own. It goes back to Edmund Burke but transforms it to fit the current globalized world: there is "no longer any 'uncivilized' spot on earth, because whether we like it or not we have really started to live in One World." vulnerable to further discrimination. It is necessary that States legislate both to prevent such discrimination from happening, and to protect vulnerable people when they are subject of discrimination.
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The UN Antidiscrimination Convention of 1965 version addresses discrimination against citizens even though not affecting distinctions states make between citizens and non-citizens. 22 Unfortunately, however, current practices still point to the crucial target of Arendt's critique, namely that the human rights regime still does not sufficiently respond to the challenge of stateless people. In an interview given in 2009, Heiner Bielefeld, human rights scholar and then
German HR Rapporteur to the UN, accused the European Union of exteriorizing their responsibility towards refugees through contracts with neighboring countries such as Turkey or
Libya. 23 Today, we can add that refugees and migrants are kept in transit, sometimes even in longterm refugee camps that span generations. In both cases, being kept outside the borders or having to live in refugee camps, refugees and/or migrants are de facto 'stateless,' rendered without rights, because their rights are not enforced. The situation has become worse both on a social and on a political level: the same reflex that was observable a century ago against denationalized groups and/or minorities returns today, for example, in some member states of the European Union:
socially, migrants and refugees are 'foreigners,' 'illegals,' 'not us'; but perhaps more importantly, they have no political rights and often only reduced protection rights. Responsibility is turned over to NGO's, setting "a dangerous precedent for European states to sidestep fundamental protection responsibilities," as the commentators of the Institute of Migration Policy has stated.
In a recent article from the summer of 2016, the German philosopher Christoph Menke has urged us to go back to Arendt's insights in order to better understand the problem of the refugee crisis that is currently shaking up European politics. 24 He identifies a mistaken alternative in the current debate: on the one hand, there is the political realism that is based on national interests; it regards the refugee problem as a national political issue only, rendering refugee rights negotiable and subordinate to the interests of the host countries; on the other hand, there is the position that Arendt held already before globalization became the defining framework of international relations, this means that nobody can be outside of this one political order-we live in a human or globalized "one-world" with no other spatial boundary than the planet itself. Refugees, who are denied the right to membership of this order of the one-world, are not 'merely' denied some more or less specific human rights-they have literally nowhere to dwell or belong. Menke holds, with Arendt, that we (still) misunderstand human rights when we interpret them as natural subjective rights, and he therefore calls for a radical reconceptualization of rights in the name of 'belonging,' as the well-known political right to membership in the one global political community.
The refugee does not say anymore: "I want or need this or that (as a human being, I have a right to it). Now, the refugee says: I am, merely as human, a member, a social part, a part theory. For Ricoeur, in contrast, the mutual recognition of agents as agents matters as ethical underpinning of the political, i.e. the capability to respond to the other in their aiming for a good life and the accountability for one's actions complement each other, being played out in the different spheres of personal, civil, and political interaction and practices. Political practices or actions therefore cannot be separated from their ethical dimension-ultimately, the point of those practices is that they must secure the possibility of recognition and respect of the inter-agents.
Institutional political practices and their inherent rules and norms, institutionalized as laws, are legitimized only insofar as they are grounded in the overall responsibility to mediate the desires and needs for recognition of all while responding with highest priority to the needs of the most vulnerable individuals or groups in particular.
From the point of view of the "capable human," Ricoeur holds, self-care, friendships with particular others, the care for these others' well-being, and the concern for the distant others are already intertwined. While friendship is the model of successful mutual recognition in close relationships, hospitality and the practice of welcoming the stranger is a practice of the "gift," a non-reciprocal giving that is, however, still rooted in the overall pursuit of recognition, aimed at transforming hospitality into mutuality through conversation, interpretation, and translation.
Regarding, for example, the 'culture of welcoming' that so many actors of the German (and European) civil society practiced in 2015 and 2016, it can be interpreted as exactly such a 'gift' that entails non-reciprocal recognition, while aiming at mutuality of recognition and respect.
Such a culture of hospitality starkly contrasts with the culture of exclusion, dehumanization and xenophobia that the groups we now call the "populists" continue to express. Ricoeur does not reduce hospitality to charity or solidarity without a link to rights or justice, but at the same time, he does not believe that granting refugees membership rights will suffice. Instead, his "little 
4-Power and (International) Authority
Arendt's theory of power, like Ricoeur's, is opposed to the tradition of Hobbes' social contract, on the one hand, and opposed to an ethnic understanding of community as Volk, on the other hand;
power is, as he states in his analysis of Arendt's text On Violence, 28 the public expression of action, which is anchored in the initiative, the new beginning that Arendt had called natality. 29 Ricoeur explicitly endorses Arendt's approach, stating: "It is as citizens that we become humans." "Macht." Yet, for Ricoeur, Arendt's philosophical turn to the plurality of civic engagement is not enough: quite the contrary, Ricoeur urges philosophy not only to attend to public opinion but, approvingly quoting Habermas' discourse ethics, to provide a critical discourse on the public discourse-a critique that necessarily must have a normative standard.
One might say, with Habermas, that the philosopher should not hold a discourse of citizens-practical discourse-but a discourse on the discourse of citizens-a discourse no longer practical, but critical-and that this critical discourse calls for reference to a regulatory idea which itself lays claim to truth and no longer to opinion. (Ricoeur 2010, 29) Now, taking into account that interaction between agents was framed in line with the "little ethics," which provides a dialectic between the teleological strivings and the deontological demands and resulting in practical compromises when no other resolution is available, how does this agency play out as political ethics? The law or legal order is an important mediation of and for the agents, and it has a particular force and binding power that can easily be mistaken for a merely legal norm in accordance with the model of domination (Herrschaft), rather than simultaneously as a moral norm in accordance with the model of power (Macht) that ultimately stems from the ethical aims for a good life of individuals, inter-acting with each other, including the establishment of just institutions that enable exactly this 'good life.' Yet, the legitimacy of legal norms rests upon the political task or responsibility to keep legality and morality together.
Legal norms, this means, must enable respect and recognition among all agents and not just "command," to be responded with "obedience." The relationship between public discourses and the legal order is so complex, Ricoeur holds, because any normative order conceals the fact that it originates in the common action of people; its origin in "common power" is easily 'forgotten,'
transforming what once was the creative power of public action into its residue, the assumedly extrinsic force of the law.
[…] The forgotten-precisely because it is not a past having being, but the force of the being-together that we are without seeing it-is not of a substantial nature. It is in fact our common power. refugees are not only welcomed by some, they are also, by some others, seen as a threat to their identity, standard of life, or their overall way of living. And still others would take a mediating position, such as, in the German controversy, discourse ethicist Konrad Ott has done. 43 Reflecting on this public-necessarily plural-discourse, the philosophical critical discourse "calls for reference to a regulatory idea which itself lays claim to truth," to quote Ricoeur's critique of Arendt via Habermas again-or, in his own words, philosophy must refer to the moral claim that addresses the agent, as the capable self, in the form of the negative categorical imperative, which
Ricoeur defined as imperative not to act in a way that will produce or prolong evil: "Because there is evil, the aim of the 'good life' has to be submitted by test of moral obligation." 44 It is important to note that 'evil' is no empty category in Ricoeur's ethics but spelled out as misrecognition, disrespect, and injustice-rooted in the same sense of justice that informs the notion of the good life; evil is inverted justice, expressed in the sense and feeling of indignation. The sense of justice and the principle of justice critically correlate, but its normative root is the acknowledgment of humans' potential for evil.
While we can understand the moral underpinning of human agency, and we can also understand the intertwining of personal and public action and its legitimizing power of institutional power, institutionalized authority. But this authority needs to be distinguished, even separated conceptually, from the 'sovereign' power of domination; rather, it is strictly bound to the concept of political action that requires legitimization as much as duration.
[…] politics is expected to provide for action the durability and solidity that it lacks. This is why an aspect of legitimation is always needed, that would at the same time be an aspect of durability. Because the creative power as public expression of action is so easily 'veiled' and 'forgotten' in the norms that bind us, the public discourse as well as the institutionalized normative orders require the critical discourse of philosophy. Philosophical critique is not detached from 'public opinion' but is connected to it in the form of critique. Hence, it cannot just mirror the 'facticity' of social values and social norms but rather, it must scrutinize them in view of the regulative idea, articulated as the moral, categorical imperative:
Act solely in accordance with the maxim by which you can wish at the same time that what ought not to be, namely evil, will indeed not exist."
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If in fact we cannot wish that the evil of Aleppo, Lampedusa, the Naaf River between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and the many other places around the world ought to be, places that are literally covered with the blood of the violence of dominating power, then we must act-together-in accordance with the maxims that at the same time ensure that this violence will no longer exist. If the international institutions, together with the nation states, do not reflect this maxim that in fact is the universalized negative categorical imperative, then they lose their legitimacy.
That refugees and migrants, however, are stripped of their rights as moral, yet vulnerable agents;
and that they do not find a space to dwell among those who are well able to recognize and respect them, personally, socially, and politically; that instead they are forced to live in transit, sometimes permanently-this reality we, the people of the One world, cannot wish to be the maxim of our action. It is a moral maxim, calling for the transformation of the international order and international law to hold states accountable. But it is also a moral maxim that calls for the transformation of our personal sense of justice, the one that informs our concept of the 'good life,' summoning us to recognize, first and foremost, the stranger as one whom we do already inter-act with, either by indifference and rejection, or by solidarity and the call for justice.
At the end of his analysis of Arendt's work, Ricoeur takes exactly such an ethical turn, paving the way for an alternative to Arendt's polity and the foundation of her vision in the American
Revolution that she ultimately traces back to the Roman civitas. Ricoeur, instead, argues for the authority of the "capable human," as the alternative foundational symbol, correlating to the common power of people inter-acting: this is the refugee Aeneas, the figuration of the responsible human of Troy:
[…] behind Rome there was Troy, represented by Aeneas carrying his father Anchises on his back. And, under Troy, how many buried foundations?
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I believe that the human rights regime, of all international regimes we can think of, has exactly the revolutionary innovative power of those who have said "no" to the violence of evil before.
They lend their authority to every human being who is capable, as a responsible and accountable agent. These 'other' founding persons, men and women alike, call for our common action, call for another 'augmentation' of a revolution, 55 it is upon all of us, the inhabitants of the One World, to spell out the actions, practices, and institutions that are in accordance with Ricoeur's three levels of agency, namely our plural ethical orientations, our universal normative obligation to fight evil and violence, and the practical and political compromises that are necessary in political life. Ultimately, however, the aim must be to protect the dignity and the rights of individuals, starting with those who are most dependent on our power, the power of innovative common action. 16 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 300. Arendt addresses the very complex issue of human dignity, human rights, and political recognition of rights far too carelessly in these few pages; she juxtaposes the private life in Greek society, the 'givenness' of 'mere existence' ruled by the "law of difference" with the public sphere, which is ruled by the "law of equality." The latter, she holds, is a political achievement: "We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of
